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Abstract. We propose a hybrid process calculus for modelling and rea-
soning on cyber-physical systems (CPSs). The dynamics of the calculus
is expressed in terms of a labelled transition system in the SOS style of
Plotkin. This is used to define a bisimulation-based behavioural seman-
tics which support compositional reasonings. Finally, we prove run-time
properties and system equalities for a non-trivial case study.
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1 Introduction
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are integrations of networking and distributed
computing systems with physical processes, where feedback loops allow physical
processes to affect computations and vice versa. For example, in real-time control
systems, a hierarchy of sensors, actuators and control processing components
are connected to control stations. Different kinds of CPSs include supervisory
control and data acquisition (SCADA), programmable logic controllers (PLC)
and distributed control systems.
The physical plant of a CPS is typically represented by means of a discrete-time
state-space model3 consisting of two equations of the form
xk+1 = Axk +Buk + wk
yk = Cxk + ek
where xk ∈ Rn is the current (physical) state, uk ∈ Rm is the input (i.e., the
control actions implemented through actuators) and yk ∈ Rp is the output
(i.e., the measurements from the sensors). The uncertainty wk ∈ Rn and the
measurement error ek ∈ Rp represent perturbation and sensor noise, respectively,
and A, B, and C are matrices modelling the dynamics of the physical system.
The next state xk+1 depends on the current state xk and the corresponding
control actions uk, at the sampling instant k ∈ N. Note that, the state xk cannot
be directly observed: only its measurements yk can be observed.
The physical plant is supported by a communication network through which
the sensor measurements and actuator data are exchanged with the controller(s),
i.e., the cyber component, also called logics, of a CPS (see Figure 1).
? An extended abstract appeared in the Proc. of LATA 2017, volume 10168 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pp. 115-127, Springer, 2017.
3 See [22] for a tassonomy of time-scale models used to represent CPSs.
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Fig. 1. Structure of a CPS
The range of CPSs applications is rapidly increasing and already covers several
domains [10]: advanced automotive systems, energy conservation, environmen-
tal monitoring, avionics, critical infrastructure control (electric power, water
resources, and communications systems for example), etc.
However, there is still a lack of research on the modelling and validation of
CPSs through formal methodologies that might allow to model the interactions
among the system components, and to verify the correctness of a CPS, as a
whole, before its practical implementation. A straightforward utilisation of these
techniques is for model-checking, i.e. to statically assess whether the current
system deployment can guarantee the expected behaviour. However, they can
also be an important aid for system planning, for instance to decide whether
different deployments for a given application are behavioural equivalent.
In this paper, we propose a contribution in the area of formal methods for
CPSs, by defining a hybrid process calculus, called CCPS, with a clearly-defined
behavioural semantics for specifying and reasoning on CPSs. In CCPS, systems
are represented as terms of the form EonP , where E denotes the physical plant
(also called environment) of the system, containing information on state variables,
actuators, sensors, evolution law, etc., while P represents the cyber component of
the system, i.e., the controller that governs sensor reading and actuator writing,
as well as channel-based communication with other cyber components. Thus,
channels are used for logical interactions between cyber components, whereas
sensors and actuators make possible the interaction between cyber and physical
components. Despite this conceptual similarity, messages transmitted via channels
are “consumed” upon reception, whereas actuators’ states (think of a valve)
remains unchanged until its controller modifies it.
CCPS is equipped with a labelled transition semantics (LTS) in the SOS
style of Plotkin [19]. We prove that our labelled transition semantics satisfies
some standard time properties such as: time determinism, patience, maximal
progress, and well-timedness. Based on our LTS, we define a natural notion of
weak bisimilarity. As a main result, we prove that our bisimilarity is a congruence
and it is hence suitable for compositional reasoning . We are not aware of similar
results in the context of CPSs. Finally, we provide a non-trivial case study, taken
from an engineering application, and use it to illustrate our definitions and our
semantic theory for CPSs. Here, we wish to remark that while we have kept the
example simple, it is actually far from trivial and designed to show that various
CPSs can be modelled in this style.
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Outline In § 2, we give syntax and operational semantics of CCPS. In § 3 we
provide a bisimulation-based behavioural semantics for CCPS and prove its com-
positionality. In § 4 we model in CCPS our case study, and prove for it run-time
properties as well as system equalities. In § 5, we discuss related and future work.
2 The Calculus
In this section, we introduce our Calculus of Cyber-Physical Systems CCPS. Let
us start with some preliminary notations. We use x, xk ∈ X for state variables;
c, d ∈ C for communication channels , a, ak ∈ A for actuator devices, s, sk ∈ S for
sensors devices . Actuator names are metavariables for actuator devices like valve,
light , etc. Similarly, sensor names are metavariables for sensor devices, e.g., a
sensor thermometer that measures, with a given precision, a state variable called
temperature. Values, ranged over by v, v′ ∈ V, are built from basic values, such
as Booleans, integers and real numbers; they also include names.
Given a generic set of names N , we write RN to denote the set of functions
assigning a real value to each name in N . For ξ ∈ RN , n ∈ N and v ∈ R, we
write ξ[n 7→ v] to denote the function ψ ∈ RN such that ψ(m) = ξ(m), for any
m 6= n, and ψ(n) = v. For ξ, ξ′ ∈ RN , we write ξ ≤ ξ′ if ξ(x) ≤ ξ′(x), for any
x ∈ N . Given ξ1 ∈ RN1 and ξ2 ∈ RN2 such that N1 ∩ N2 = ∅, we denote with
ξ1 unionmulti ξ2 the function in RN1∪N2 such that (ξ1 unionmulti ξ2)(x) = ξ1(x), if x ∈ N1, and
(ξ1unionmulti ξ2)(x) = ξ2(x), if x ∈ N2. Finally, given ξ ∈ RN and a set of namesM⊆ N ,
we write ξ|M for the restriction of function ξ to the set M.
In CCPS, a cyber-physical system consists of two components: a physical
environment E that encloses all physical aspects of a system (state variables,
physical devices, evolution law, etc) and a cyber component , represented as
a concurrent process P that interacts with the physical devices (sensors and
actuators) of the system, and can communicate, via channels, with other processes
of the same CPS or with processes of other CPSs.
We write EonP to denote the resulting CPS, and use M and N to range over
CPSs. Let us formally define physical environments.
Definition 1 (Physical environment). Let Xˆ ⊆ X be a set of state variables,
Aˆ ⊆ A be a set of actuators, and Sˆ ⊆ S be a set of sensors. A physical
environment E is 7-tuple 〈ξx, ξu, ξw, evol , ξe,meas, inv〉, where:
– ξx ∈ RXˆ is the state function,
– ξu ∈ RAˆ is the actuator function,
– ξw ∈ RXˆ is the uncertainty function,
– evol : RXˆ × RAˆ × RXˆ → 2RXˆ is the evolution map,
– ξe ∈ RSˆ is the sensor-error function,
– meas : RXˆ × RSˆ → 2RSˆ is the measurement map,
– inv : RXˆ → {true, false} is the invariant function.
All the functions defining an environment are total functions.
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The state function ξx returns the current value (in R) associated to each state
variable of the system. The actuator function ξu returns the current value
associated to each actuator. The uncertainty function ξw returns the uncertainty
associated to each state variable. Thus, given a state variable x ∈ Xˆ , ξw(x)
returns the maximum distance between the real value of x and its representation
in the model. Both the state function and the actuator function are supposed to
change during the evolution of the system, whereas the uncertainty function is
supposed to be constant.
Given a state function, an actuator function, and an uncertainty function,
the evolution map evol returns the set of next admissible state functions. This
function models the evolution law of the physical system, where changes made
on actuators may reflect on state variables. Since we assume an uncertainty in
our models, the evolution map does not return a single state function but a
set of possible state functions. The evolution map is obviously monotone with
respect to uncertainty: if ξw ≤ ξ′w then evol(ξx, ξu, ξw) ⊆ evol(ξx, ξu, ξ′w). Note
also that, although the uncertainty function is constant, it can be used in the
evolution map in an arbitrary way (e.g., it could have a heavier weight when a
state variable reaches extreme values).
The sensor-error function ξe returns the maximum error associated to each
sensor in Sˆ. Again due to the presence of the sensor-error function, the mea-
surement map meas , given the current state function, returns a set of admissible
measurement functions rather than a single one.
Finally, the invariant function inv represents the conditions that the state
variables must satisfy to allow for the evolution of the system. A CPS whose
state variables don’t satisfy the invariant is in deadlock.
Let us now formalise in CCPS the cyber components of CPSs. Our (logical)
processes build on the timed process algebra TPL [9] (basically CCS enriched
with a discrete notion of time). We extend TPL with two constructs: one to read
values detected at sensors, and one to write values on actuators. The remaining
processes of the calculus are the same as those of TPL.
Definition 2 (Processes). Processes are defined by the grammar:
P,Q ::= nil
∣∣ idle.P ∣∣ P ‖ Q ∣∣ bpi.P cQ ∣∣ [b]{P}, {Q} ∣∣ P\c ∣∣ X ∣∣ recX.P .
We write nil for the terminated process. The process idle.P sleeps for one
time unit and then continues as P . We write P ‖ Q to denote the paral-
lel composition of concurrent processes P and Q. The process bpi.P cQ, with
pi ∈ {snd c〈v〉, rcv c(x), read s(x),write a〈v〉}, denotes prefixing with timeout. Thus,
bsnd c〈v〉.P cQ sends the value v on channel c and, after that, it continues as
P ; otherwise, if no communication partner is available within one time unit, it
evolves into Q. The process brcv c(x).P cQ is the obvious counterpart for receiv-
ing. bread s(x).P cQ reads the value v detected by the sensor s and, after that,
it continues as P , where x is replaced by v; otherwise, after one time unit, it
evolves into Q. bwrite a〈v〉.P cQ writes the value v on the actuator a and, after
that, it continues as P ; otherwise, after one time unit, it evolves into Q. The
process P\c is the channel restriction operator of CCS. It is quantified over the
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set C of communication channels but we often use the shorthand P\C to mean
P\c1\c2 · · · \cn, for C = {c1, c2, . . . , cn}. The process [b]{P}, {Q} is the standard
conditional, where b is a decidable guard. For simiplicity, as in CCS, we identify
process [b]{P}, {Q} with P , if b evaluates to true, and [b]{P}, {Q} with Q, if b
evaluates to false. In processes of the form idle.Q and bpi.P cQ, the occurrence of
Q is said to be time-guarded. The process recX.P denotes time-guarded recursion
as all occurrences of the process variable X may only occur time-guarded in P .
In the two constructs brcv c(x).P cQ and bread s(x).P cQ, the variable x is said
to be bound . Similarly, the process variable X is bound in recX.P . This gives rise
to the standard notions of free/bound (process) variables and α-conversion. We
identify processes up to α-conversion (similarly, we identify CPSs up to renaming
of state variables, sensor names, and actuator names). A term is closed if it
does not contain free (process) variables, and we assume to always work with
closed processes: the absence of free variables is preserved at run-time. As further
notation, we write T{v/x} for the substitution of the variable x with the value v
in any expression T of our language. Similarly, T{P/X} is the substitution of the
process variable X with the process P in T .
The syntax of our CPSs is slightly too permissive as a process might use
sensors and/or actuators which are not defined in the physical environment.
Definition 3 (Well-formedness). Given a process P and an environment
E = 〈ξx, ξu, ξw, evol , ξe,meas, inv〉, the CPS EonP is well-formed if: (i) for any
sensor s mentioned in P , the function ξe is defined in s; (ii) for any actuator a
mentioned in P , the function ξu is defined in a.
Hereafter, we will always work with well-formed networks.
Finally, we assume a number of notational conventions. We write pi.P instead
of recX.bpi.P cX, when X does not occur in P . We write snd c (resp. rcv c)
when channel c is used for pure synchronisation. For k ≥ 0, we write idlek.P as a
shorthand for idle.idle. . . . idle.P , where the prefix idle appears k consecutive times.
Given M = EonP , we write M ‖ Q for Eon (P ‖ Q), and M\c for EonP\c.
2.1 Labelled Transition Semantics
In this section, we provide the dynamics of CCPS in terms of a labelled transition
system (LTS) in the SOS style of Plotkin. In Definition 4, for convenience, we
define some auxiliary operators on environments.
Definition 4. Let E = 〈ξx, ξu, ξw, evol , ξe,meas, inv〉.
– read sensor(E, s) = {ξ(s) : ξ ∈ meas(ξx, ξe)},
– update act(E, a, v) = 〈ξx, ξu[a7→v], ξw, evol , ξe,meas, inv〉,
– next(E) =
⋃
ξ∈evol(ξx,ξu,ξw){〈ξ, ξu, ξw, evol , ξe,meas, inv〉},
– inv(E) = inv(ξx).
The operator read sensor(E, s) returns the set of possible measurements detected
by sensor s in the environment E; it returns a set of possible values rather than
a single value due to the error ξe(s) of sensor s. update act(E, a, v) returns the
6 R. Lanotte and M. Merro
(Outp)
−
bsnd c〈v〉.P cQ cv−−−→ P
(Inpp)
−
brcv c(x).P cQ cv−−−→ P{v/x}
(Write)
−
bwrite a〈v〉.P cQ a!v−−−→ P
(Read)
−
bread s(x).P cQ s?v−−−→ P{v/x}
(Com)
P
cv−−−→ P ′ Q cv−−−→ Q′
P ‖ Q τ−−→ P ′ ‖ Q′
(Par)
P
λ−−→ P ′ λ 6= idle
P ‖ Q λ−−→ P ′ ‖ Q
(ChnRes)
P
λ−−→ P ′ λ 6∈ {cv, cv}
P\c λ−−→ P ′\c
(Rec)
P{recX.P/X} λ−−→ Q
recX.P
λ−−→ Q
(TimeNil)
−
nil
idle−−−→ nil
(Delay)
−
idle.P
idle−−−→ P
(Timeout)
−
bpi.P cQ idle−−−→ Q
(TimePar)
P
idle−−−→ P ′ Q idle−−−→ Q′ P ‖ Q 6 τ−−→
P ‖ Q idle−−−→ P ′ ‖ Q′
Table 1. LTS for processes
new environment in which the actuator function is updated in such a manner to
associate the actuator a with the value v. next(E) returns the set of the next
admissible environments reachable from E, by an application of the evolution
map. inv(E) checks whether the state variables satisfy the invariant (here, with
an abuse of notation, we overload the meaning of the function inv).
In Table 1, we provide transition rules for processes. Here, the meta-variable
λ ranges over labels in the set {idle, τ, cv, cv, a!v, s?v}. Rules (Outp), (Inpp) and
(Com) serve to model channel communication, on some channel c. Rules (Write)
denotes the writing of some data v on an actuator a. Rule (Read) denotes the
reading of some data v via a sensor s. Rule (Par) propagates untimed actions over
parallel components. Rules (ChnRes) and (Rec) are the standard rules for channel
restriction and recursion, respectively. The following four rules are standard, and
model the passage of one time unit. The symmetric counterparts of rules (Com)
and (Par) are obvious and thus omitted from the table.
In Table 2, we lift the transition rules from processes to systems. All rules
have a common premise inv(E): a CPS can evolve only if the invariant is
satisfied, otherwise it is deadlocked. Here, actions, ranged over by α, are in the set
{τ, cv, cv, idle}. These actions denote: non-observable activities (τ); observable
logical activities, i.e., channel transmission (cv and cv); the passage of time (idle).
Rules (Out) and (Inp) model transmission and reception, with an external system,
on a channel c. Rule (SensRead) models the reading of the current data detected
at sensor s. Rule (ActWrite) models the writing of a value v on an actuator a.
Rule (Tau) lifts non-observable actions from processes to systems. A similar lifting
occurs in rule (Time) for timed actions, where next(E) returns the set of possible
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(Out)
P
cv−−−→ P ′ inv(E)
EonP cv−−−→ EonP ′
(Inp)
P
cv−−−→ P ′ inv(E)
EonP cv−−−→ EonP ′
(SensRead)
P
s?v−−−→ P ′ inv(E) v ∈ read sensor(E, s)
EonP τ−−→ EonP ′
(ActWrite)
P
a!v−−−→ P ′ inv(E) E′ = update act(E, a, v)
EonP τ−−→ E′onP ′
(Tau)
P
τ−−→ P ′ inv(E)
EonP τ−−→ EonP ′
(Time)
P
idle−−−→ P ′ EonP τ−−→6 inv(E) E′ ∈ next(E)
EonP idle−−−→ E′onP ′
Table 2. LTS for CPSs
environments for the next time slot. Thus, by an application of rule (Time) a
CPS moves to the next physical state, in the next time slot.
Now, having defined the actions that can be performed by a CPS, we can
easily concatenate these actions to define execution traces. Formally, given a
trace t = α1 . . . αn, we will write
t−−→ as an abbreviation for α1−−−→ . . . αn−−−→.
Below, we report a few desirable time properties which hold in our calculus:
(a) time determinism, (b) maximal progress, (c) patience, and (d) well-timedness
(symbol ≡ denotes standard structural congruence for timed processes [17,15]).
Theorem 5 (Time properties). Let M = EonP .
(a) If M
idle−−−→ EˆonQ and M idle−−−→ E˜onR, then {Eˆ, E˜} ⊆ next(E) and Q ≡ R.
(b) If M
τ−−→M ′ then there is no M ′′ such that M idle−−−→M ′′.
(c) If M
idle−−−→ M ′ for no M ′ then either next(E) = ∅ or inv(M) = false or
there is N such that M
τ−−→ N .
(d) For any M there is a k ∈ N such that if M α1−−−→ · · · αn−−−→ N , with αi 6= idle,
then n ≤ k.
Well-timedness [15,5] ensures the absence of infinite instantaneous traces which
would prevent the passage of time, and hence the physical evolution of a CPS.
3 Bisimulation
Once defined the labelled transition semantics, we are ready to define our
bisimulation-based behavioural equality for CPSs. We recall that the only ob-
servable activities in CCPS are: time passing and channel communication. As a
consequence, the capability to observe physical events depends on the capability
of the cyber components to recognise those events by acting on sensors and
actuators, and then signalling them using (unrestricted) channels.
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We adopt a standard notation for weak transitions: we write =⇒ for the
reflexive and transitive closure of τ -actions, namely (
τ−−→)∗, whereas α==⇒ means
=⇒ α−−→=⇒, and finally αˆ=⇒ denotes =⇒ if α = τ and α=⇒ otherwise.
Definition 6 (Bisimulation). A binary symmetric relation R over CPSs is a
bisimulation if M R N and M α−−→ M ′ implies that there exists N ′ such that
N
αˆ
==⇒ N ′ and M ′ R N ′. We say that M and N are bisimilar, written M ≈ N ,
if M R N for some bisimulation R.
A main result of the paper is that our bisimilarity can be used to compare
CPSs in a compositional manner. In particular, our bisimilarity is preserved
by parallel composition of (non-interfering) CPSs, by parallel composition of
(non-interfering) processes, and by channel restriction.
Two CPSs do not interfere with each other if they have a disjoint physical plant.
Thus, let Ei = 〈ξix, ξiu, ξiw, evol i, ξie,measi, inv i〉 with sensors in Sˆi, actuators in
Aˆi, and state variables in Xˆi, for i ∈ {1, 2}. If Sˆ1 ∩ Sˆ2 = ∅ and Aˆ1 ∩ Aˆ2 = ∅ and
Xˆ1 ∩ Xˆ2 = ∅, then we define the disjoint union of the environments E1 and E2,
written E1 unionmulti E2, to be the environment 〈ξx, ξu, ξw, evol , ξe,meas, inv〉 such that:
ξx = ξ
1
x unionmulti ξ2x, ξu = ξ1u unionmulti ξ2u, ξw = ξ1w unionmulti ξ2w, ξe = ξ1e unionmulti ξ2e , and
evol(ξ, ψ, φ) = {ξ′ = ξ1 unionmulti ξ2 : ξi ∈ evol i(ξ|Xˆi , ψ|Aˆi , φ|Xˆi), for i ∈ {1, 2}}
meas(ξ, ψ) = {ξ′ = ξ1 unionmulti ξ2 : ξi ∈ measi(ξ|Xˆi , ψ|Sˆi), for i ∈ {1, 2}}
inv(ξ) = inv1(ξ|Xˆ1) ∧ inv
2(ξ|Xˆ2) .
Definition 7 (Non-interfering CPSs). Let Mi = EionPi, for i ∈ {1, 2}. We
say that M1 and M2 do not interfere with each other if E1 and E2 have disjoint
sets of state variables, sensors and actuators. In this case, we write M1 unionmultiM2 to
denote the CPS defined as (E1 unionmulti E2)on (P1 ‖ P2).
A similar but simpler definition can be given for processes. Let M = EonP ,
a non-interfering process Q is a process which does not interfere with the plant
E as it never accesses its sensors and/or actuators. Thus, in the system M ‖ Q
the process Q cannot interfere with the physical evolution of M . However,
process Q can definitely affect the observable behaviour of the whole system by
communicating on channels. Notice that, as we only consider well-formed CPSs
(Definition 3), a non-interfering processes is basically a (pure) TPL process [9].
Definition 8 (Non-interfering processes). A process P is called non-interfering
if it never acts on sensors and/or actuators.
Now, everything is in place to prove the compositionality of our bisimilarity
≈.
Theorem 9 (Congruence results). Let M and N be two CPSs.
1. M ≈ N implies M unionmultiO ≈ N unionmultiO, for any non-interfering CPS O
2. M ≈ N implies M ‖ P ≈ N ‖ P , for any non-interfering process P
3. M ≈ N implies M\c ≈ M\c, for any channel c.
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The presence of invariants in the definition of physical environment makes the
proof of the second item of the theorem above non standard.
As we will see in the next section, these compositional properties will be very
useful when reasoning about complex systems.
4 Case study
In this section, we model in CCPS an engine, called Eng , whose temperature is
maintained within a specific range by means of a cooling system. The physical
environment Env of the engine is constituted by: (i) a state variable temp con-
taining the current temperature of the engine; (ii) an actuator cool to turn on/off
the cooling system; (iii) a sensor st (such as a thermometer or a thermocouple)
measuring the temperature of the engine; (iv) an uncertainty δ = 0.4 associated to
the only variable temp; (v) a simple evolution law that increases (resp., decreases)
the value of temp of one degree per time unit if the cooling system is inactive
(resp., active) — the evolution law is obviously affected by the uncertainty δ; (vi)
an error  = 0.1 associated to the only sensor st; (vii) a measurement map to
get the values detected by sensor st, up to its error ; (viii) an invariant function
saying that the system gets faulty when the temperature of the engine gets out
of the range [0, 30].
Formally, Env = 〈ξx, ξu, ξw, evol , ξe,meas, inv〉 with:
– ξx ∈ R{temp} and ξx(temp) = 0;
– ξu ∈ R{cool} and ξu(cool) = off; for the sake of simplicity, we can assume ξu
to be a mapping {cool} → {on, off} such that ξu(cool) = off if ξu(cool) ≥ 0,
and ξu(cool) = on if ξu(cool) < 0;
– ξw ∈ R{temp} and ξw(temp) = 0.4 = δ;
– evol(ξix, ξ
i
u, ξw) =
{
ξ : ξ(temp) = ξix(temp) + heat(ξ
i
u, cool) + γ ∧ γ ∈
[−δ,+δ]}, where heat(ξiu, cool) = −1 if ξiu(cool) = on (active cooling), and
heat(ξiu, cool) = +1 if ξ
i
u(cool) = off (inactive cooling);
– ξe ∈ R{st} and ξe(st) = 0.1 = ;
– meas(ξix, ξe) =
{
ξ : ξ(st) ∈ [ξix(temp)− , ξix(temp)+]
}
;
– inv(ξx) = true if 0 ≤ ξx(temp) ≤ 30; inv(ξx) = false, otherwise.
The cyber component of Eng consists of a process Ctrl which models the
controller activity. Intuitively, process Ctrl senses the temperature of the engine
at each time interval. When the sensed temperature is above 10, the controller
activates the coolant. The cooling activity is maintained for 5 consecutive time
units. After that time, if the temperature does not drop below 10 then the
controller transmits its ID on a specific channel for signalling a warning , it keeps
cooling for another 5 time units, and then checks again the sensed temperature;
otherwise, if the sensed temperature is not above the threshold 10, the controller
turns off the cooling and moves to the next time interval. Formally,
Ctrl = recX.read st(x).[x > 10]{Cooling}, {idle.X}
Cooling = write cool〈on〉.recY.idle5.read st(x).
[x > 10]{snd warning〈ID〉.Y }, {write cool〈off〉.idle.X} .
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Fig. 2. Simulations in MATLAB of the engine Eng
The whole engine is defined as: Eng = Env onCtrl , where Env is the physical
environment defined before.
Our operational semantics allows us to formally prove a number of run-time
properties of our engine. For instance, the following proposition says that our
engine never reaches a warning state and never deadlocks. never reaches a warning
state.
Proposition 10. Let Eng be the CPS defined before. If Eng
α1−−−→ . . . αn−−−→
Eng ′, for some Eng ′, then αi ∈ {τ, idle}, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and there is Eng ′′ such
that Eng ′
α−−→ Eng ′′, for some αi ∈ {τ, idle}.
Actually, we can be quite precise on the temperature reached by the engine
before and after the cooling activity: in each of the 5 time slots of cooling, the
temperature will drop of a value laying in the interval [1−δ, 1+δ], where δ is the
uncertainty of the model. Formally,
Proposition 11. For any execution trace of Eng, we have:
– when Eng turns on the cooling, the value of the state variable temp ranges
over (10−  , 11 + + δ];
– when Eng turns off the cooling, the value of the variable temp ranges over
(10− − 5∗(1+δ) , 11 + + δ − 5∗(1−δ)].
In Figure 2, the left graphic collects a campaign of 100 simulations, lasting
250 time units each, showing that the value of the state variable temp when
the cooling system is turned on (resp., off) lays in the interval (9.9, 11.5] (resp.,
(2.9, 8.5]); these bounds are represented by the dashed horizontal lines. Since
δ = 0.4, these results are in line with those of Proposition 11. The right graphic
shows three examples of possible evolutions in time of the state variable temp.
Now, the reader may wonder whether it is possible to design a variant of
our engine which meets the same specifications with better performances. For
instance, an engine consuming less coolant. Let us consider a variant of the engine
described before:
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Fig. 3. Simulations in MATLAB of coolant consumption
Eng = Env onCtrl .
Here, Env is the same as Env except for the evolution map, as we set heat(ξiu, cool) =
−0.8 if ξiu(cool) = on. This means that in Eng we reduce the power of the cooling
system by 20%. In Figure 3, we report the results of our simulations over 10000
runs lasting 10000 time units each. From this graph, Eng saves in average more
than 10% of coolant with respect to Eng . So, the new question is: are these two
engines behavioural equivalent? Do they meet the same specifications?
Our bisimilarity provides us with a precise answer to these questions.
Proposition 12. The two variants of the engine are bisimilar: Eng ≈ Eng.
At this point, one may wonder whether it is possible to improve the perfor-
mances of our engine even more. For instance, by reducing the power of the
cooling system by a further 10%, by setting heat(ξiu, cool) = −0.7 if ξiu(cool) = on.
We can formally prove that this is not the case.
Proposition 13. Let Êng be the same as Eng, except for the evolution map, in
which heat(ξiu, cool) = −0.7 if ξiu(cool) = on. Then, Eng 6≈ Êng.
Finally, we show how we can use the compositionality of our behavioural
semantics (Theorem 9) to deal with bigger CPSs. Suppose that Eng denotes the
modelisation of an airplane engine. In this case, we could define in CCPS a very
simple airplane control system that checks whether the left engine (EngL) and
the right engine (EngR) are signalling warnings. The whole CPS is defined as
follows:
Airplane =
(
(EngL unionmulti EngR) ‖ Check
)\{warning}
where EngL = Eng{L/ID}{temp l/temp}{cool l/cool}{st l/st}, and, similarly, EngR =
Eng{R/ID}{temp r/temp}{cool r/cool}{st r/st}, and process Check is defined as:
Check = recX.brcvwarning(x).[x = L]{CheckL1}, {CheckR1 }cX
Check idi = brcvwarning(y).[y 6= id ]{snd alarm.idle.X}, {idle.Check idi+1}cCheck idi+1
Check id5 = brcvwarning(z).[z 6= id ]{snd alarm.idle.X}, {snd failure〈id〉.idle.X}c
snd failure〈id〉.X
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for 1 ≤ i ≤ 5. Intuitively, if one of the two engines is in a warning state then the
process Check idi , for id ∈ {L,R}, checks whether also the second engine moves
into a warning state, in the following 5 time intervals (i.e. during the cooling
cycle). If both engines gets in a warning state then an alarm is sent, otherwise,
if only one engine is facing a warning then the airplane control system yields a
failure signalling which engine is not working properly.
So, since we know that Eng ≈ Eng , the final question becomes the following:
can we safely equip our airplane with the more performant engines, EngL and
EngR, in which heat(ξ
i
u, cool) = −0.8 if ξiu(cool) = on, without affecting the
whole observable behaviour of the airplane? The answer is “yes”, and this result
can be formally proved by applying Proposition 12 and Theorem 9.
Proposition 14. Let Airplane =
(
(EngL unionmulti EngR) ‖ Check
)\{warning}. Then,
Airplane ≈ Airplane.
5 Related and Future Work
A number of approaches have been proposed for modelling CPSs using formal
methods. For instance, hybrid automata [1] combine finite state transition systems
with discrete variables (whose values capture the state of the modelled discrete
or cyber components) and continuous variables (whose values capture the state
of the modelled continuous or physical components).
Hybrid process algebras [6] are a powerful tool for reasoning about physical
systems and provide techniques for analysing and verifying protocols for hybrid
automata. CCPS shares some similarities with the φ-calculus [20], a hybrid exten-
sion of the pi-calculus [17]. In the φ-calculus, a hybrid system is represented as a
pair (E,P ), where E is the environment and P is the process interacting with
the environment. Unlike CCPS, in φ-calculus, given a system (E,P ) the process P
can dynamically change both the evolution law and the invariant of the system.
However, the φ-calculus does not have a representation of physical devices and
measurement law. Concerning behavioural semantics, the φ-calculus is equipped
with a weak bisimilarity between systems that is not compositional.
In the HYPE process algebra [8], the continuous part of the system is repre-
sented by appropriate variables whose changes are determined by active influences
(i.e., commands on actuators). The authors defines a strong bisimulation that
extends the ic-bisimulation of [3]. Unlike ic-bisimulation, the bisimulation in
HYPE is preserved by a notion of parallel composition that is slightly more
permessive than ours. However, bisimilar systems in HYPE must always have
the same influence. Thus, in HYPE we cannot compare CPSs sending different
commands on actuators at the same time, as we do in Proposition 12.
Vigo et al. [21] proposed a calculus for wireless-based cyber-physical systems
endowed with a theory to study cryptographic primitives, together with explicit
notions of communication failure and unwanted communication. The calculus
does not provide any notion of behavioural equivalence. It also lacks a clear
distinction between physical and logical components.
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Lanese et al. [11] proposed an untimed calculus of mobile IoT devices inter-
acting with the physical environment by means of sensors and actuators. The
calculus does not allow any representation of the physical environment, and
the bisimilarity is not preserved by parallel composition (compositionality is
recovered by significantly strengthening the discriminating power).
Lanotte and Merro [13] extended and generalised the work of [11] in a timed
setting by providing a bisimulation-based semantic theory that is suitable for
compositional reasoning. As in [11], the physical environment is not represented.
Bodei et al. [4] proposed an untimed process calculus supporting a control
flow analysis to track how data spread from sensors to the logics of the network,
and how physical data are manipulated. Sensors and actuators are modelled as
value-passing CCS channels. The dynamics of the calculus is given in terms of a
reduction relation and no behavioural equivalence is defined.
As regards future works, we believe that our paper can lay and streamline
theoretical foundations for the development of formal and automated tools to
verify CPSs before their practical implementation. To that end, we will consider
applying, possibly after proper enhancements, existing tools and frameworks for
automated verification, such as Maude [18], Ariadne [2], and SMC UPPAAL [7],
resorting to the development of an dedicated tool if existing ones prove not up to
the task. Finally, in [14], we developed an extended version of CCPS to provide a
formal study of a variety of cyber-physical attacks targeting physical devices. Also
in this case, the final goal is to develop formal and automated tools to analyse
security properties of CPSs.
Acknowledgements We thank Riccardo Muradore for providing us with simula-
tions in MATLAB.
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A Proofs
We recall that the cyber-components our CPSs are basically TPL-processes [9]
extended with constructs to read sensors and write actuators. TPL already enjoys
time determinism, patience and maximal progress. The well-timedness property
is present in many process calculi with a discrete notion of time (e.g. [15]) similar
to ours. Thus, it is straightforward to rewrite the proofs of those results for our
slight variant of TPL.
Proposition 15 (Processes time properties [9,15]).
– If P
idle−−−→ Q and P idle−−−→ R, then Q ≡ R.
– If P
τ−−→ P ′ then there is no P ′′ such that P idle−−−→ P ′′.
– If P
idle−−−→ P ′ for no P ′ then there is Q such that P τ−−→ Q.
– For any P there is a k ∈ N such that if P λ1−−−→ · · · λn−−−→ P , with λi 6= idle,
then n ≤ k.
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The challenge in the proof of Theorem 5 is to lift the results of Proposition 15
to the CPSs of CCPS.
In its standard formulation, time determinism says that a system reaches
at most one new state by executing a idle-action. However, by an application
of Rule (Time), our CPSs may nondeterministically move into a new physical
environment, according to the evolution law.
Proposition 16 (Time determinism for CPSs). If M
idle−−−→ EˆonQ and
M
idle−−−→ E˜onR, then {Eˆ, E˜} ⊆ next(E) and Q ≡ R.
Proof. Let M = EonP . Since the only possible rule to derive idle−−−→ is rule (Time),
then we have that there is Q, R, Eˆ, E˜ such that
P
idle−−−→ Q M τ−−→6 inv(E) Eˆ ∈ next(E)
M
idle−−−→ EˆonQ
and
P
idle−−−→ R M τ−−→6 inv(E) E˜ ∈ next(E)
M
idle−−−→ E˜onR
.
The result follows by Proposition 15.
According to [9], the maximal progress property says that processes com-
municate as soon as a possibility of communication arises. In our calculus, we
generalise this property saying that τ -actions cannot be delayed, independently
on how they are generated.
Proposition 17 (Maximal progress for CPSs). If M
τ−−→M ′ then there is
no M ′′ such that M
idle−−−→M ′′.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Let us suppose M
idle−−−→M ′′, for some M ′′.
This is only possible by an application of rule (Time):
P
idle−−−→ P ′ M τ−−→6 inv(E) E′ ∈ next(E)
M
idle−−−→M ′′
with M ′′ = E′onP ′. However, the premises requires M τ−−→6 which contradicts
the fact that M
τ−−→M ′.
Patience in CCPS is more involved with respect to the same property in TPL.
It basically says that if a CPS cannot evolve in time, then either (i) the physical
plant does not contemplate an evolution, or (ii) the invariant is violated, or (iii)
the CPS can perform an internal action.
Proposition 18 (Patience for CPS). If M
idle−−−→M ′ for no M ′ then either
next(E) = ∅ or inv(M) = false or there is N such that M τ−−→ N .
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Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Let us suppose that M
idle−−−→ M ′ for no
M ′, and M
τ−−→6 and inv(E) = true and E′ ∈ next(E), for some E′. Since the
only possible rule to derive
idle−−−→ is rule (Time), then M idle−−−→ M ′ for no M ′,
implies that the following derivation is not admissible for any P ′ and E′:
P
idle−−−→ P ′ M τ−−→6 inv(E) E′∈next(E)
M
idle−−−→ E′onP ′
.
Since M
τ−−→6 and inv(E) = true and E′ ∈ next(E), for some E′, the only
possibility is P
idle−−−→ P ′ for no P ′. Since P idle−−−→ P ′ for no P ′, by Proposition 15
we have that P
τ−−→ P ′. Since inv(E) = true, by an application of rule (Tau) there
is N such that M
τ−−→ N . This contradicts the initial hypothesis that M τ−−→6 .
[5,16,12]
The following property is well-timedness. It basically says that time passing
cannot be prevented by infinite sequences of internal actions.
Proposition 19 (Well-timedness for CPSs). For any M there is a k ∈ N
such that if M
α1−−−→ · · · αn−−−→ N , with αi 6= idle, then n ≤ k.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose there is no k satisfying the state-
ment above. Hence there exists an unbounded derivation
M = M1
α1−−−→ · · · αn−−−→Mn+1
αn+1−−−−−→ . . .
with Mi = EionPi and αi 6= idle.
By inspection of rules of Table 2 we have that, for any i, Mi
αi−−−→ Mi+1
and αi 6= idle implies that Pi λi−−−→ Pi+1, for some λi 6= idle. Hence we have the
following unbounded derivation
P1
λ1−−−→ · · · λn−−−→ Pn+1
λn+1−−−−−→ . . .
with λi 6= idle. In contradiction with Proposition 15.
Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. The result follows by an application of Proposition 16, Proposition 17,
Proposition 18 and Proposition 19.
In order to prove the compositionality or our bisimilarity, i.e. Theorem 9, we
divide its statement in three different propositions.
In order to prove that ≈ preserves contextuality, we need a number of
technical lemmas. Lemma 20 formalises a number of properties of the compound
environment E1 unionmulti E2.
Lemma 20. Let E1 and E2 be two physical environments. If defined, the envi-
ronment E1 unionmulti E2 has the following properties:
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1. read sensor(E1 unionmultiE2, s) is equal to read sensor(E1, s), if s is a sensor of E1,
and it is equal to read sensor(E2, s), if s is a sensor of E2;
2. v ∈ read sensor(E1, s) implies that v ∈ read sensor(E1 unionmulti E2, s) for any
sensor s in E1 and for any environment E2;
3. update act(E1 unionmulti E2, a, v) is equal to update act(E1, a, v) unionmulti E2, if a is an
actuator of E1, and it is equal to E1unionmultiupdate act(E2, a, v), if a is an actuator
of E2;
4. update act(E1, a, v)unionmultiE2 is equal to update act(E1unionmultiE2, a, v) for any actuator
a in E1 and for any environment E2;
5. next(E1 unionmulti E2) = {E′1 unionmulti E′2 : E′1 ∈ next(E1) and E′2 ∈ next(E2) };
6. inv(E1 unionmulti E2) = inv(E1) ∧ inv(E2).
Proof. By definition of the operator unionmulti on physical environments.
Lemma 21 serves to propagate untimed actions on parallel CPSs.
Lemma 21. If M
α−−→ M ′, with α 6= idle, then M unionmulti O α−−→ M ′ unionmulti O, for any
non-interfering CPS O, with inv(O) = true.
Proof. The proof is by rule induction on why M
α−−→M ′. Let us suppose that
M = E1onP1 and O = E2onP2, for some E1, E2, P1 and P2. We can distinguish
several cases on why M
α−−→ M ′. We prove the case in which M α−−→ M ′ is
derived by an application of rule (SensRead). The other cases can be proved in a
similar manner. In this case, we have α = τ and there are s, v, and P ′1 such that
P1
s?v−−−→ P ′1 inv(E1) v ∈ read sensor(E1, s)
M
τ−−→M ′
with M ′ = E1onP ′1.
Since P1
s?v−−−→ P ′1, by an applicaiton of rule (Par) we can derive P1 ‖
P2
s?v−−−→ P ′1 ‖ P2. Since inv(E1) = true and, by hypothesis, inv(E2) = true,
by an application of Lemma 20(6) we derive that inv(E1 unionmulti E2) = true. Since
v ∈ read sensor(E1, s), by an application of Lemma 20(2) we derive that
v ∈ read sensor(E1 unionmulti E2, s). This is enough to derive that:
P1 ‖ P2 s?v−−−→ P ′1 ‖ P2 inv(E1 unionmulti E2) v ∈ read sensor(E1 unionmulti E2, s)
M unionmultiO τ−−→ E1 unionmulti E2onP ′1 ‖ P2
.
Hence the result follows by assuming M ′ = E1onP ′ and M ′unionmultiO = E1unionmultiE2onP ′1 ‖
P2.
Next lemma says the invariants of bisimilar CPSs must agree.
Lemma 22. M ≈ N implies inv(M) = inv(N).
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Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that M ≈ N , inv(M) = true and
inv(N) = false (the other case is similar). By Proposition 19, there exists a finite
derivation M
τ−−→M1 τ−−→ · · · τ−−→Mn, with Mn τ−−→6 . Since inv(N) = false, the
CPSs N cannot perform any action, and in particular, N
τ−−→6 . From M ≈ N we
derive that Mi ≈ N , for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Since Mn τ−−→6 , by Proposition 17 it follows
that Mn
idle−−−→ M ′, for some M ′. Since inv(N) = false , we have N idle−−−→6 and
hene also N 6idle===⇒.
Summarising: Mn ≈ N , Mn idle−−−→ M ′ and N 6idle===⇒ which contradict the
definition of bisimilarity.
Here comes one of the main technical result: the bisimilarity is preserved by
the parallel composition of non-interfering CPSs.
Proposition 23. M ≈ N implies M unionmultiO ≈ N unionmultiO, for any non-interfering CPS
O.
Proof. We show that the relation R = R1 ∪R2 is a bisimulation where:
R1 = {(M unionmultiO, N unionmultiO) : M ≈ N}
R2 = {(M,N) : inv(M) = inv(N) = false} .
The relation R2 is trivially a bisimulation because it contains pairs of deadlocked
CPSs. Thus, we focus on when (M unionmultiO, N unionmultiO) ∈ R1.
We proceed by case analysis on why M unionmultiO α−−→ Mˆ (the case when N unionmultiO α−−→
Nˆ is symmetric).
– Let M unionmulti O τ−−→ Mˆ , with M = E1onP1 and O = E2onP2, for some E1, E2,
P1 and P2, by an application of rule (SensRead). This implies that
P1 ‖ P2 s?v−−−→ P ′ inv(E1 unionmulti E2) v ∈ read sensor(E1 unionmulti E2, s)
M unionmultiO τ−−→ Mˆ
with Mˆ = E1 unionmultiE2onP ′. We recall that by definition of unionmulti the environments
E1 and E2 have different physical devices. Thus, there are two cases:
• s is a sensor of E1.
In this case, P1
s?v−−−→ P ′1, for some P ′1, and hence P ′ = P ′1 ‖ P2. Since
inv(E1 unionmulti E2) = true and v ∈ read sensor(E1 unionmulti E2, s), by an application
of Lemma 20(1) and Lemma 20(6), we derive inv(E1) = inv(E2) = true
and v ∈ read sensor(E1, s). Now, let M ′ = E1onP ′1; it follows that Mˆ =
M ′ unionmultiO. Since P1 s?v−−−→ P ′1, inv(E1) = true, and v ∈ read sensor(E1, s),
by an application of rule (SensRead) we have M
τ−−→ M ′. As M ≈ N ,
there is N ′ such that N =⇒ N ′ with M ′ ≈ N ′. Since inv(E2) = true, by
several applications of Lemma 21 it follows that N unionmultiO =⇒ N ′ unionmultiO = Nˆ ,
with (Mˆ, Nˆ) ∈ R1 ⊆ R.
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• s is a sensor of E2.
In this case, P2
s?v−−−→ P ′2, for some P ′2, and hence P ′ = P1 ‖ P ′2. Let
O′ = E2onP ′2; it follows that Mˆ = M unionmulti O′ = E1 unionmulti E2on (P1 ‖ P ′2). Let
N = E3onP3, for some E3 and P3. By an application of rule (Par) we have
that P3 ‖ P2 s?v−−−→ P3 ‖ P ′2. Since inv(E1unionmultiE2) and v ∈ read sensor(E1unionmulti
E2, s), by an application of Lemma 20(1) and Lemma 20(6), we derive
inv(E1) = inv(E2) = true and v ∈ read sensor(E2, s). As M ≈ N , by
Lemma 22 it follows that inv(E3) = true, and hence inv(E3 unionmulti E2) =
true. Since v ∈ read sensor(E2, s), by Lemma 20(2), it follows that
v ∈ read sensor(E3 unionmulti E2, s).
Summarising P3 ‖ P2 s?v−−−→ P3 ‖ P ′2, v ∈ read sensor(E3 unionmulti E2, s), and
inv(E3 unionmulti E2) = true. Thus, by an application of rule (SensRead) we have
N unionmultiO τ−−→ N unionmultiO′, with (M unionmultiO′, N unionmultiO′) ∈ R1 ⊆ R.
– Let M unionmulti O τ−−→ Mˆ , with M = E1onP1 and O = E2onP2, for some E1, E2,
P1 and P2, by an application of rule (ActWrite). This case is similar to the
previous ones. Basically we apply Lemma 20(3) instead of Lemma 20(1), and
Lemma 20(4) instead of Lemma 20(2).
– Let M unionmulti O τ−−→ Mˆ , with M = E1onP1 and O = E2onP2, for some E1, E2,
P1 and P2, by an application of rule (Tau):
P1 ‖ P2 τ−−→ P ′ inv(E1 unionmulti E2)
M unionmultiO τ−−→ Mˆ
with Mˆ = E1 unionmulti E2onP ′. We can distinguish four cases.
• Let P1 ‖ P2 τ−−→ P ′ by an application of rule (Par), because P1 τ−−→ P ′1
and P ′ = P ′1 ‖ P2, for some P ′1. Since inv(E1 unionmulti E2), by Lemma 20(6),
inv(E1) = inv(E2) = true. Let M
′ = E1onP ′1; we have that Mˆ = M ′ unionmultiO.
Since P1
τ−−→ P ′1 and inv(E1) = true, by an application of rule (Tau) we
derive M
τ−−→ M ′. As M ≈ N , there is N ′ such that N =⇒ N ′ with
M ′ ≈ N ′. Since inv(E2) = true, by several applications of Lemma 21 we
have that N unionmultiO =⇒= N ′ unionmultiO = Nˆ , with (Mˆ, Nˆ) ∈ R1 ⊆ R.
• Let P1 ‖ P2 τ−−→ P ′ by an application of rule (Par), because P2 τ−−→ P ′2
and P ′ = P1 ‖ P ′2, for some P ′2. Let O′ = E2onP ′2; it follows that
Mˆ = M unionmulti O′ = E1 unionmulti E2on (P1 ‖ P ′2). Let N = E3onP3, for some E3
and P3. By an application of rule (Par) we have that P3 ‖ P2 τ−−→ P3 ‖
P ′2. Since inv(E1 unionmulti E2), by an application of Lemma 20(6), we derive
inv(E1) = inv(E2) = true. As M ≈ N , by Lemma 22 it follows that
inv(E3) = true, and hence inv(E3 unionmulti E2) = true.
Summarising P3 ‖ P2 τ−−→ P3 ‖ P ′2 and inv(E3 unionmulti E2) = true. Thus, by
an application of rule (Tau) we have N unionmulti O τ−−→ N unionmulti O′ = Nˆ , with
(Mˆ, Nˆ) ∈ R1 ⊆ R.
• Let P1 ‖ P2 τ−−→ P ′ by an application of rule (Com) because P1 cv−−−→ P ′1
and P2
cv−−−→ P ′2 and P ′ = P ′1 ‖ P ′2, for some P ′1 and P ′2. Since inv(E1 unionmulti
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E2) = true, by Lemma 20(6) follows that inv(E1) = inv(E2) = true.
Let M ′ = E1onP ′1 and O′ = E2onP ′2; we have that Mˆ = M ′ unionmulti O′.
Since P1
cv−−−→ P ′1 and inv(E1) = true, by an application of rule (Out)
we have M
cv−−−→ M ′. As M ≈ N , there are N1, N2 and N ′ such that
N =⇒ N1 cv−−−→ N2 =⇒ N ′, with M ′ ≈ N ′. Since inv(E2) = true, by an
appropriate number of applications of Lemma 21 we have that N unionmultiO =⇒
N1 unionmultiO. Moreover, N1 cv−−−→ N2 implies that P3 cv−−−→ P ′3 for some P3 and
P ′3 and E3 such that N1 = E3onP3 and N2 = E3onP ′3 and inv(E3) = true.
Since P2
cv−−−→ P ′2 we can use rules (Com) to derive P2 ‖ P3
τ−−→ P ′2 ‖ P ′3.
Moreover from the fact that both inv(E2) = true and inv(E3) = true we
can derive, by Lemma 20(6), that inv(E3 unionmulti E2) = true.
Summarising P2 ‖ P3 τ−−→ P ′2 ‖ P ′3 and inv(E3 unionmulti E2) = true, and,
for O = E2onP2 and O′ = E2onP ′2, we can use rule (Tau) to derive
N1 unionmultiO τ−−→ N2 unionmultiO′. Since inv(E2) = true, by an appropriate number of
applications of Lemma 21, we get N2 unionmultiO′ =⇒ N ′ unionmultiO′. As M ′ ≈ N ′, it
follows that
(
M ′ unionmultiO′ , N ′ unionmultiO′) ∈ R1 ⊆ R.
• Let P1 ‖ P2 τ−−→ P ′ by an application of rule (Com) because P1 cv−−−→ P ′1
and P2
cv−−−→ P ′2, for some P ′1 and P ′2. This case is similar to the previous
one.
– Let M unionmultiO idle−−−→ Mˆ , with M = E1onP1 and O = E2onP2 , for some E1, E2,
P1 and P2. This action can be derived only by an application of rule (Time):
P1 ‖ P2 idle−−−→ P ′ M unionmultiO τ−−→6 inv(E1 unionmulti E2) E′ ∈ next(E1 unionmulti E2)
M unionmultiO idle−−−→ Mˆ
with Mˆ = E′onP ′.
The derivation P1 ‖ P2 idle−−−→ P ′ follows by an application of rule (TimePar)
because P1
idle−−−→ P ′1 and P2
idle−−−→ P ′2, for some P ′1 and P ′2, such that
P ′ = P ′1 ‖ P ′2. Since inv(E1 unionmulti E2), by Lemma 20(6) follows that inv(E1) =
inv(E2) = true. Since E
′ ∈ next(E1 unionmulti E2), by Lemma 20(5) follows that
E′ = E′1 unionmulti E′2, for some E′1 ∈ next(E1) and E′2 ∈ next(E1). Furthermore,
since M unionmultiO τ−−→6 , by Lemma 21 follows that M τ−−→6 and O τ−−→6 .
Thus, since P1
idle−−−→ P ′1, M
τ−−→6 , inv(E1) = true, and E′1 ∈ next(E1), by an
application of rule (Time) it follows that M
idle−−−→ M ′, with M ′ = E′1onP ′1.
Similarly, from P2
idle−−−→ P ′2, O
τ−−→6 , inv(E2) = true, and E′2 ∈ next(E2),
we can derive that O
idle−−−→ O′, with O′ = E′2onP ′2. As a consequence,
Mˆ = M ′ unionmultiO′ = E′1 unionmulti E′2onP ′1 ‖ P ′2.
Now, from M ≈ N and M idle−−−→M ′, there are N1, N2 and N ′ such that N =⇒
N1
idle−−−→ N2 =⇒ N ′, with M ′ ≈ N ′. Since inv(E2) = true, by an appropriate
number of applications of Lemma 21 we have that N unionmultiO =⇒ N1unionmultiO. Next, we
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show that we can apply rule (Time) to derive N1 unionmultiO idle−−−→ N2 unionmultiO′. For that
we only need to prove that N1 unionmultiO τ−−→6 . We reason by contradiction. Since
M ≈ N and N =⇒ N1, there is M1 such that M =⇒M1, with M1 ≈ N1. Since
M
τ−−→6 , it follows that M = M1 ≈ N1. Since N1 idle−−−→ N2 and O idle−−−→ O′,
by an application of Theorem 5(b) we can derive N1
τ−−→6 and O τ−−→6 . Thus,
N1 unionmultiO τ−−→ could be derived only by an application of rule (Com) where N1
interact with O, via some channel c. However, as N1 ≈ M the network M
could mimic the same interaction (via the same channel c) with O, giving rise
to a reduction of the form M unionmultiO =⇒ τ−−→. This is in contradiction with the
initial premises that M unionmultiO τ−−→6 . Thus, N1 unionmultiO τ−−→6 and by an application
of rule (Time) we can derive N1 unionmultiO idle−−−→ N2 unionmultiO′. It remanins to determine
the possible evolutions of N2 unionmultiO′.
There are two cases:
• The invariant of O′ is true.
In this case, by an appropriate number of applications of Lemma 21 we get
N2unionmultiO′ =⇒ N ′unionmultiO′. Thus, NunionmultiO idle===⇒ N ′unionmultiO′, with (M ′unionmultiO′ , N ′unionmultiO′) ∈
R1 ⊆ R, because M ′ ≈ N ′.
• The invariant of O′ is false.
In this case, we have that N unionmultiO idle===⇒ N2unionmultiO′, with (M ′unionmultiO′ , N ′unionmultiO′) ∈
R2 ⊆ R, because inv(O′) = false.
– Let M unionmultiO cv−−−→ Mˆ , with M = E1onP1 and O = E2onP2, for some E1, E2,
E′, P1, P2 and P ′. This derivation can be only due to an application of rule
(Inp):
P1 ‖ P2 cv−−−→ P ′ inv(E1 unionmulti E2)
M unionmultiO cv−−−→ Mˆ
with Mˆ = E1 unionmulti E2onP ′. We distinguish two cases.
• P1 cv−−−→ P ′1, for some P ′1 such that P = P ′1 ‖ P2.
Then, let M ′ = E1onP ′1; we have that Mˆ = M ′unionmultiO. Since inv(E1unionmultiE2), by
Lemma 20(6), it follows that inv(E1) = inv(E2) = true. Since P1
cv−−−→ P ′1
and inv(E1) = true, by an application of (Inp) on M we can derive
M
cv−−−→M ′. As M ≈ N , there is N ′ such that N cv=⇒ N ′ with M ′ ≈ N ′.
Since inv(E2) = true, by several applications of Lemma 21 we have that
N unionmultiO cv=⇒= N ′ unionmultiO = Nˆ , with (Mˆ, Nˆ) ∈ R1 ⊆ R.
• P2 cv−−−→ P ′2, for some P ′2 such that P = P1 ‖ P ′2.
Let O′ = E2onP ′2; we have that Mˆ = M unionmultiO′. Since inv(E1 unionmultiE2) = true,
by Lemma 20(6) it follows that inv(E2) = true. LetN = E3onP3, for some
E3 and P3. Since M ≈ N and inv(E2) = true, by Lemma 22 we derive
inv(E3) = true. By Lemma 20(6) it follows that that inv(E3 unionmultiE2) = true.
Furthermore, by an application of rule (Par) we have P3 ‖ P2 cv−−−→ P3 ‖
P ′2.
Summarising: P3 ‖ P2 cv−−−→ P3 ‖ P ′2 and inv(E3 unionmulti E2) = true. Thus, by
an application of rule (Inp) we derive N unionmulti O cv=⇒= N unionmulti O′ = Nˆ , with
(Mˆ, Nˆ) ∈ R1 ⊆ R.
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– Let M unionmultiO cv−−−→ Mˆ . This case is similar to the previous one.
Now, let us prove the our bisimilarity is preserved by parallel composition of
non-interfering processes. This is a special case of the previous result.
Proposition 24. M ≈ N implies M ‖ P ≈ N ‖ P , for any non-interfering
process P .
Proof. We have to prove that M ≈ N implies M ‖ P ≈ N ‖ P , for any process
P which does not access any physical device.
Let E∅ be the environment with an empty set of state variables, sensors
and actuators. It is straightforward to prove that M ‖ P ≈ M unionmulti (E∅onP ) and
N ‖ P ≈ N unionmulti (E∅onP ). Since ≈ is preserved by the operator unionmulti, the result follows
by transitivity of ≈.
Finally, we prove that bisimilarity is preserved by channel restriction.
Proposition 25. M ≈ N implies M\c ≈ N\c, for any channel c.
Proof. It is enough to show that the relation {(M\c , N\c) : M ≈ N} is a
bisimulation. The proof proceeds by case analysis on why M \ c α−−→ Mˆ .
Proof of Theorem 9
Proof. By Proposition 23, Proposition 24 and Proposition 25.
In order to prove Proposition 10 and Proposition 11 we use the following
lemma that formalises the invariant properties binding the state variable temp
with the activity of the cooling system.
Intuitively, when the cooling system is inactive the value of the state variable
temp lays in the interval [0, 11 + + δ]. Furthermore, if the coolant is not active
and the variable temp lays in the interval (10 + , 11 +  + δ] then the cooling
will be turned on in the next time slot. Finally, when active then cooling system
will remain so for k ∈ 1..5 time slots (counting also the current time slot) being
the variable temp in the real interval (10− − k∗(1+δ), 11 + + δ − k∗(1−δ)].
Lemma 26. Let Eng be the system defined in § 4. Let
Eng = Eng1
t1−−−→ idle−−−→ Eng2 t2−−−→ idle−−−→ · · ·
tn−1−−−−−→ idle−−−→ Engn
such that the traces tj contain no idle-actions, for any j ∈ 1..n−1, and for any
i ∈ 1..n Engi = EionPi with Ei = 〈ξix, ξiu, δ, evol , ,meas, inv〉. Then, for any
i ∈ 1..n−1 we have the following:
1. if ξiu(cool) = off then ξ
i
x(temp) ∈ [0, 11 + + δ];
2. if ξiu(cool) = off and ξ
i
x(temp) ∈ (10 + , 11 +  + δ] then, in the next time
slot, ξi+1u (cool) = on;
3. if ξiu(cool) = on then ξ
i
x(temp) ∈ (10− − k∗(1+δ), 11 + + δ− k∗(1−δ)], for
some k ∈ 1..5 such that ξi−ku (cool) = off and ξi−ju (cool) = on, for j ∈ 0..k−1.
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Proof. Let us denote with vi the values of the state variable temp in the systems
Engi , i.e., ξ
i
x(temp) = vi. Moreover we will say that the coolant is active (resp.,
is not active) in Engi if ξ
i
u(cool) = on (resp., ξ
i
u(cool) = off).
The proof is by mathematical induction on n, i.e., the number idle-actions of
our traces.
The case base n = 1 follows directly from the definition of Eng .
Let prove the inductive case. We assume that the three statements holds for
n− 1 and we prove that they also hold for n.
1. Let us assume that the cooling is not active in Engn , then we prove that
vn ∈ [0, 11 + + δ].
We consider separately the cases in which the coolant is active or not in
Engn−1
– Suppose the coolant is not active in Engn−1 (and inactive in Engn).
By inductive hypothesis we have vn−1 ∈ [0, 11 + + δ]. Furthermore, if
vn−1 ∈ (10 + , 11 +  + δ] then, by inductive hypotheses, the coolant
must be active in Engn . Since we know in Engn the cooling is not active
it follows that vn−1 ∈ [0, 10 + ]. Furthermore, Engn the temperature will
increase of a value laying in the interval [1− δ, 1 + δ] = [0.6, 1.4]. Thus
vn will be in [0.6, 11 + + δ] ⊆ [0, 11 + + δ].
– Suppose the coolant is active in Engn−1 (and inactive in Engn).
By inductive hypothesis vn−1 ∈ (10− −k ∗ (1+δ), 11+ +δ−k ∗ (1−δ)]
for some k ∈ 1..5 such that the coolant is not active in Engn−1−k and is
active in Engn−k , . . . ,Engn−1 .
The case k ∈ {1, . . . , 4} is not admissible. In fact if k ∈ {1, . . . , 4} then
the coolant would be active for less than 5 idle-actions as we know that
Engn is inactive.
Hence it must be k = 5. Since δ = 0.4,  = 0.1 and k = 5, it holds that
vn−1 ∈ (10− 0.1− 5 ∗ 1.4, 11 + 0.1 + 0.4− 5 ∗ 0.6] = (2.8, 8.6]. Moreover,
since the coolant is active for 5 idle actions, the controller of Engn−1
checks the temperature. However, since vn−1 ∈ (2.8, 8.6] then the coolant
is turned off. Thus, in the next time slot, the temperature will increase
of a value in [1− δ, 1 + δ] = [0.6, 1.4]. As a consequence in Engn we will
have vn ∈ [2.8 + 0, 6, 8.6 + 1.4] = [3.4, 10] ⊆ [0, 11 + + δ].
2. Let us assume that the coolant is not active in Engn and vn ∈ (10+, 11++δ],
then we prove that the coolant is active in Engn+1 . Since the coolant is not
active in Engn then it will check the temperature before the next time slot.
Since vn ∈ (10 + , 11 + + δ] and  = 0.1, then the process Ctrl will sense
a temperature greater than 10 and the coolant will be turned on. Thus the
coolant will be active in Engn+1 .
3. Let us assume that the coolant is active in Engn , then we prove that vn ∈
(10− − k ∗ (1 + δ), 11 + + δ− k ∗ (1− δ)] for some k ∈ 1..5 and the coolant
is not active in Engn−k and active in Engn−k+1 , . . . ,Engn .
We separate the case in which the coolant is active in Engn−1 from that in
which is not active.
– Suppose the coolant is not active in Engn−1 (and active in Engn).
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In this case k = 1 as the coolant is not active in Engn−1 and it is active in
Engn . Since k = 1, we have to prove vn ∈ (10−−(1+δ), 11++δ−(1−δ)].
However, since the coolant is not active in Engn−1 and is active in Engn
it means that the coolant has been switched on in Engn−1 because the
sensed temperature was above 10 (this may happen only if vn−1 > 10−).
By inductive hypothesis, since the coolant is not active in Engn−1 , we
have that vn−1 ∈ [0, 11 +  + δ]. Therefore, from vn−1 > 10 −  and
vn−1 ∈ [0, 11++δ] it follows that vn−1 ∈ (10−, 11++δ]. Furthermore,
since the coolant is active in Engn , the temperature will decrease of a
value in [1−δ, 1+δ] and therefore vn ∈ (10−−(1+δ), 11++δ−(1−δ)]
which concludes this case of the proof.
– Suppose the coolant is active in Engn−1 (and active in Engn as well).
By inductive hypothesis there is h ∈ 1..5 such that vn−1 ∈ (10− − h ∗
(1 + δ), 11 + + δ−h ∗ (1− δ)] and the coolant is not active in Engn−1−h
and is active in Engn−h , . . . ,Engn−1 .
The case h = 5 is not admissible. In fact, since δ = 0.4 and  = 0.1, if h = 5
then vn−1 ∈ (10−0.1−5∗1.4, 11+0.1+δ−5∗0.6] = (2.8, 8.6]. Furthermore,
since the coolant is already active since 5 idle actions, the controller of
Engn−1 is supposed to check the temperature. As vn−1 ∈ (2.8, 8.6] the
coolant should be turned off. In contradiction with the the fact that the
coolant is active in Engn .
Hence it must be h ∈ 1..4. Let us prove that for k = h + 1 we obtain
our result. Namely we have to prove that, for k = h + 1, (i) vn ∈
(10− − k ∗ (1 + δ), 11 + + δ − k ∗ (1− δ)], and (ii) the coolant is not
active in Engn−k and active in Engn−k+1 , . . . ,Engn .
Let us prove the statement (i). By inductive hypotheses, it holds that
vn−1 ∈ (10− − h ∗ (1 + δ), 11 + + δ − h ∗ (1− δ)]. Since the coolant is
active in Engn then the temperature will decrease Hence, vn ∈ (10− −
(h+ 1) ∗ (1 + δ), 11 + + δ− (h+ 1) ∗ (1− δ)]. Therefore, since k = h+ 1,
we have that vn ∈ (10− − k ∗ (1 + δ), 11 + + δ − k ∗ (1− δ)].
Let us prove the statement (ii). By inductive hypothesis the coolant is
inactive in Engn−1−h and it is active in Engn−h , . . . ,Engn−1 . Now, since
the coolant is active in Engn , for k = h+1, we have that the coolant is not
active in Engn−k and is active in Engn−k+1 , . . . ,Engn which concludes
this case of the proof.
Proof of Proposition 10
Proof. By Lemma 26 and since δ = 0.4 and  = 0.1, the value of the state variable
temp is always in the real interval [0, 11.5]. As a consequence, the invariant of
the system is never violated and the system never deadlocks. Moreover, after
5 idle -actions of cooling the state variable temp is always in the real interval
(10− 0.1− 5 ∗ 1.4, 11 + 0.1 + 0.4− 5 ∗ 0.6] = (2.9, 8.5]. Hence the process Ctrl
will never transmit on the channel warning .
Proof of Proposition 11
Proof. Let us prove the two statements separately.
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– If process Ctrl senses a temperature above 10 (and hence Eng turns on the
cooling) then the value of the state variable temp is greater than 10− . By
Lemma 26 the value of the state variable temp is always less or equal than
11 + + δ. Therefore, if Ctrl senses a temperature above 10, then the value
of the state variable temp is in (10− , 11 + + δ].
– By Lemma 26 (third item) the coolant can be active for no more than 5 time
slots. Hence, by Lemma 26, when Eng turns off the cooling system the state
variable temp ranges over (10− − 5 ∗ (1 + δ), 11 + + δ − 5 ∗ (1− δ)].
In order to prove Proposition 12 we use the following lemma that is a variant
of Lemma 26. Differently from Lemma 26, when active then cooling system will
remain so for k ∈ 1..5 time slots (counting also the current time slot) being the
variable temp in the real interval (10− − k∗(0.8+δ), 11.5− k∗(0.8−δ)].
Lemma 27. Let Eng be the system defined in § 4. Let
Eng = Eng1
t1−−−→ idle−−−→ Eng2 t2−−−→ idle−−−→ · · ·
tn−1−−−−−→ idle−−−→ Engn
such that the traces tj contain no idle-actions, for any j ∈ 1..n−1, and for any
i ∈ 1..n Engi = EionPi with Ei = 〈ξix, ξiu, δ, evol , ,meas, inv〉. Then, for any
i ∈ 1..n−1 we have the following:
1. if ξiu(cool) = off then ξ
i
x(temp) ∈ [0, 11 + + δ];
2. if ξiu(cool) = off and ξ
i
x(temp) ∈ (10 + , 11 +  + δ] then, in the next time
slot, ξi+1u (cool) = on;
3. if ξiu(cool) = on then ξ
i
x(temp) ∈ (10−−k∗(0.8+δ), 11++δ−k∗(0.8−δ)], for
some k ∈ 1..5 such that ξi−ku (cool) = off and ξi−ju (cool) = on, for j ∈ 0..k−1.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 26.
Proof of Proposition 12
Proof. By Proposition 10 is sufficient to prove that Eng has no trace which
deadlocks or emits an alarm.
By Lemma 27 and since δ = 0.4 and  = 0.1, the value of the state variable
temp is always in the real interval [0, 11.5]. As a consequence, the invariant of
the system is never violated and the system never deadlocks. Moreover, after
5 idle -actions of cooling the state variable temp is always in the real interval
(10− 0.1− 5 ∗ 1.2, 11 + 0.1 + 0.4− 5 ∗ 0.4] = (3.9, 9.5]. Hence the process Ctrl
will never transmit on the channel warning .
Proof of Proposition 13
Proof. It is is enough to prove that there exists an execution trace of the engine
Êng containing an output along channel warning . Then the result follows by an
application of Proposition 10.
We can easily build up a trace for Êng in which, after 10 idle-actions, in the
11-th time slot, the value of the state variable temp is 10.1. In fact, it is enough
to increase the temperature of 1.01 degrees for the first 10 rounds. Notice that
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this is an admissible value since, 1.01 ∈ [1 − δ, 1 + δ] = [0.6, 1.4]. Being 10.1
the value of the state variable temp, there is an execution trace in which the
sensed temperature is 10 (recall that  = 0.1) and hence the cooling system is
not activated. However, in the following time slot, i.e. the 12-th time slot, the
temperature may reach at most the value 10.1 + 1 + δ = 11.5, imposing the
activation of the cooling system. After 5 time units of cooling, in the 17-th time
slot, the variable temp will be at most 11.5 − 5 ∗ (0.7 − δ) = 11.5 − 1.5 = 10.
Since  = 0.1, the sensed temperature would be in the real interval [9.9, 10.1].
Thus, there is an execution trace in which the sensed temperature is 10.1, which
will be greater than 10. As a consequence, the warning will be emitted, in the
17-th time slot.
Proof of Proposition 14
Proof. By Proposition 12 we derive Eng ≈ Eng . By simple α-conversion it follows
that EngL ≈ EngL and EngR ≈ EngR, respectively. By Theorem 9(1) (and
transitivity of ≈) it follows that EngLunionmultiEngR ≈ EngLunionmultiEngR. By Theorem 9(2) it
follows that (EngLunionmultiEngR) ‖ Check ≈ (EngLunionmultiEngR) ‖ Check . By Theorem 9(3)
we obtain Airplane ≈ Airplane.
